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ABSTRACT
Large dams have been controversially debated for decades due to their large-scale and often irre-
versible social and environmental impacts. In the pursuit of low-carbon energy and climate change
mitigation, hydropower is experiencing a new renaissance. At the forefront of this renaissance are
Chinese actors as the world’s largest hydropower dam-builders. This paper aims to discuss the
role of South–South technology transfer of low-carbon energy innovation and its opportunities
and barriers by using a case study of the ﬁrst large Chinese-funded and Chinese-built dam in
Cambodia. Using the Kamchay Dam as an example, the paper ﬁnds that technology transfer
can only be fully successful when host governments and organizations have the capacity to absorb
new technologies. The paper also ﬁnds that technology transfer in the dam sector needs to go be-
yond hardware and focus more on the transfer of expertise, skills and knowledge to enable long-
term sustainable development. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Introduction
POORCOUNTRIES SUCH AS CAMBODIA DEPEND ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR OBTAINING ACCESS TO STATE-OF-THE-ARTlow-carbon technology such as large hydropower dams.Large dams1 have been controversially debated for several decades due to their large-scale and oftenirreversible social and environmental impacts (WCD, 2000). In the pursuit of low-carbon energy and climate
1A brief disclaimer has to be made about the ‘low-carbon’ or ‘low-emission’ label of large dams. Compared with the pre-dam natural river ﬂow, the
dam reservoir usually creates deeper water and slower water ﬂow speeds, which can lead to an increase in methane and CO2 emissions (Chang
et al., 2009). Other greenhouse gas emissions are methane and nitrous oxide from the bacterial decomposition of organic material underwater
(such as rotting trees) and the greenhouse emissions from the production phase of hydropower dams, particularly CO2 emissions from cement
production for the dam-building (Fearnside, 2002; Rosa et al., 2004; Ruiz-Suarez et al., 2003). Nevertheless, calculated over the entire lifetime of
the hydropower plants, the greenhouse gas emissions are far less than for fossil-fuel power plants and are comparable to those of other renewable
energy technologies (Urban et al., 2013), and are therefore considered an option for achieving sustainable development.
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changemitigation, hydropower is experiencing a new renaissance inmany parts of the world, despite its vulnerability to
climate change and the emissions of greenhouse gases from its reservoirs and during dam construction (IPCC, 2011).
Chinese actors, such as Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), are the world’s largest dam-builders.
While China has a long history of domestic dam-building and water management (Bai and Imura, 2001), recent
developments have led to Chinese-funded and Chinese-built overseas dams, particularly in low- and middle-income
countries in Asia and Africa (Bosshard, 2009; McDonald et al., 2009; International Rivers, 2012). Chinese ‘going
out strategy’ encourages overseas investments to access natural resources such as energy and water resources
(Mohan and Power, 2008, McNally et al., 2009; Wu and Flynn, 1995), including for electricity imports and to power
overseas industries (Urban et al., 2013).
There are currently more than 330 Chinese-funded and Chinese-built overseas dams, most of them in Southeast
Asia (38%) and Africa (26%). The large majority of these are large dams that have been built since 2000 (Interna-
tional Rivers, 2014), at a time when other dam-building nations and organizations, particularly those from the
OECD, withdrew from the dam-building industry.
For poor countries such as Cambodia in Southeast Asia, large dams from Chinese investors are a welcome oppor-
tunity to obtain modern energy technology that can help reduce energy poverty, power the economy and lead to sus-
tainable development. In a country with an electriﬁcation rate of 34% in 2011, poor grid infrastructure and large
electricity imports (IEA, 2014), large dams are seen as a symbol of modernity and a prospect for a brighter, more
prosperous future. While OECD investors tend to shy away from investing in Cambodia’s sub-par energy sector,
South–South technology transfer from Chinese dam-builders offers rarely seen opportunities. The Kamchay
Dam, which is Cambodia’s ﬁrst large dam, demonstrates however that Cambodia has also relatively little capacity
to absorb the new large-scale technology and to sustainably manage its environmental and social implications.
While the absorptive capacity for hydropower innovation is low, both production capabilities and innovation capa-
bilities are largely absent. In the speciﬁc case of the Kamchay Dam, technology transfer of hardware has occurred
successfully; nevertheless, the transfer of the ‘software’, such as the knowledge, skills, expertise and experience of
how to plan for, build, manage and operate the dam sustainably, is lagging behind. This is also partly due to the
limited sustainability of the practices of the technology-transferring country. We therefore suggest that successful
technology transfer for sustainable development needs to involve improved practices on both the recipient and the
technology-transferring sides.
Against this background, the paper aims to discuss the role of South–South technology transfer of low-carbon
energy innovation by using the Kamchay Dam, the ﬁrst large Chinese-funded and built hydropower dam in
Cambodia, as a case study. The research question for this paper is as follows: what are the opportunities, barriers
and implications of the technology transfer deal between China and Cambodia for the Kamchay Hydropower
Dam and what does this mean for sustainable development? Key literature in the ﬁeld of technology transfer
discusses the need for North–South technology transfer and cooperation for enabling access to low-carbon in-
novation in low- and middle-income countries (Ockwell and Mallett, 2012; Watson et al., 2014; Bell, 2009;
Brewer, 2008; Pietrobelli, 2000; Able-Thomas, 1996; Bell, 1990). It is suggested that a comprehensive change
is needed from technology transfer to socio-technical transformations (Byrne et al., 2011, 2012). While there is
a large body of literature on North–South technology transfer, there is far less literature on South–South tech-
nology transfer. Empirical research on South–South technology transfer of low-carbon innovation is rare. This
paper aims to add to the understanding of this as yet under-explored, but highly timely and relevant, ﬁeld of
literature.
The analysis is based on extensive research and ﬁeldwork in Cambodia and China funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council’s (ESRC’s) Rising Powers programme for the ‘China goes global’ project (ESRC reference
ES/J01320X/1). It draws on 61 semi-structured in-depth interviews with local communities, local and national
governments, dam-builders and ﬁnanciers as well as 10 focus group discussions. In addition, we conducted a
multi-level stakeholder mapping, used quantitative supplementary data from the International Rivers’ dams data-
base and conducted an analysis of ﬁrm strategies, environmental impact assessment (EIA) documentation and
national legislations.
The following section discusses Chinese-funded and Chinese-built overseas dams and their role in Cambodia,
the next section presents the conceptual framework and methodology, the fourth section elaborates the ﬁndings
and the last section discusses the ﬁndings and concludes the paper.
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Chinese-Funded and Chinese-Built Overseas Dams and their Role in Cambodia
Chinese-Funded and Chinese-Built Overseas Dams
The World Bank stopped funding large dams between the mid-1990s and 2010 due to their severe negative environ-
mental and social impacts, just to start funding them again in 2011. During this gap of more than a decade, Chinese
dam-builders became the global dam leaders by providing funding, engineering expertise and technological
innovation for large dams. Still, the controversies around dams have not gone away; in fact, the standards and
the sustainability of dams are still rather low with regard to the social and environmental impacts.
Chinese dam-builders are directly involved in the construction of more than 330 overseas dams around the world
(International Rivers, 2014). The majority of the dams are located in Asia (57%, mainly in Southeast Asia (38%)),
followed by Africa (26%), Latin America (8%), Europe (7%, mainly Eastern Europe), the Middle East and the Paciﬁc
(1% each).
The Chinese are involved in overseas dam investments with different roles. They can act as ﬁnanciers, developers
and builders as well as sub-contractors only or acting as a combination of these roles. Usually they are involved in at
least two of the above tasks (Urban et al., 2013). Looking particularly at Chinese ﬁnanciers, they act as investors in 115
overseas dam projects. The main Chinese ﬁnanciers are state-owned banks (SOBs), mainly China Export Import
(Exim) Bank and China Development Bank, and in only a few cases state-owned enterprises, private enterprises
or development funds. For the majority of the investments (66%), China acts as the sole ﬁnancier. In 22% of the
cases national host governments participate in the investment, for the remaining 13% of the cases international in-
vestors also participate together with Chinese dam-builders, and in few cases the investors are national ﬁnanciers,
such as the governments of host countries (International Rivers, 2014).
Sinohydro is the Chinese SOE most involved in the construction of overseas dams, as both builder and sub-
contractor as Figure 1 shows. Sinohydro is leading the global hydropower sector as the world’s largest dam company
in terms of number and size of dams built, investment sums and global coverage. It is followed by China Interna-
tional Water and Electric Corp. (CWE), China Gezhouba Group Company Limited and China Three Gorges Corpo-
ration (International Rivers, 2014). In general, almost all of the Chinese companies involved in the construction of
overseas dams are state owned. The role of the Chinese government is therefore crucial in inﬂuencing the overseas
strategy of the country in terms of investments, as well as technical support, especially for large infrastructural pro-
jects such as dams.
Energy Poverty and Dams in Cambodia
About nine million people in Cambodia still lack energy access. The electriﬁcation rate in urban areas is high, at
97%; however, in rural areas the rate is considerably lower, accounting for only 18% (IEA, 2014). Electricity produc-
tion in Cambodia is 90% reliant on oil products such as kerosene and diesel. Cambodia’s electricity production is
far below the country’s needs, and imports (1644 GW h) exceed by far the domestic production (1053 GW h) (IEA,
Figure 1. Chinese dam-builders involved in overseas dam projects. Data source: International Rivers (2014)
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2014). Cambodia therefore relies heavily on imported oil for the production of electricity, as well as on electricity
imports, mainly from neighbouring countries, primarily Vietnam and Thailand. Overall, Cambodia has some of
the highest electricity costs in the world due to the above-mentioned issues, despite being a low-income country
(IEA, 2014).
According to the National Strategic Development Plan 2009–2013 (NSDP), energy is central to sustainable
growth and poverty reduction in Cambodia. Improving the power sector is one of the government’s key priorities
in ensuring a reliable, secure electricity supply at affordable prices (RGC, 2010). Hydropower development repre-
sents the ﬁrst energy priority: it is expected to substantially replace fossil fuel consumption for electricity generation.
Currently, there are seven hydropower dams in operation, and more than 70 further hydropower projects were in
the process of planning, under study and under construction in Cambodia in late 2014.
The government adopted the National Policy on Green Development and the National Strategic Plan on Green
Development 2013–2030, which includes hydropower targets (RGC, 2013a, 2013b). In the long term, Cambodia
hopes to export some of its electricity to neighbouring countries to gain revenue. Cambodia’s Minister of Public
Works and Transport, Khy Tainglim, reported this vision: ’‘Water is our oil […] and we should use our water to ex-
port and get foreign currency to develop the country’ (cited by Goh, 2004, p. 7).
However, activists and environmentalists have expressed their concerns for the social and environmental conse-
quences of such projects. For instance, experts have warned that the construction of dams in some places such as
Koh Kong and Kratié Provinces could greatly affect the rivers’ ﬁsh populations, thereby impacting people’s food se-
curity, and threaten the only remaining habitats of endangered species such as the freshwater Irrawaddy dolphin
and the Siamese crocodile (Heng, 2012).
Good leadership and accountable governance with a long-term vision of achieving sustainable development are
needed in order to ensure that Cambodian–Chinese cooperation will ultimately bring positive outcomes (Heng,
2012). This will also need to be transparent and include the disclosure of relevant information, as well as promoting
a participatory and inclusive development approach by engaging relevant stakeholders, minimizing any potential
negative impacts on the environmental and socio-economic conditions, and making sure that the beneﬁts are shared
among all parties involved, particularly the local communities (Heng, 2012).
Conceptual Framework and Methodology
Conceptual Framework
The paper draws on the theories of international technology transfer for low-carbon innovation (Ockwell and Mallett,
2012; Bell, 1990; Brewer, 2008). Innovation is here deﬁned as creating something new or developing a new product,
service or idea (Rogers, 2003). Low-carbon innovation is crucial to achieve low-carbon energy transitions and to mit-
igate climate change. The diffusion of low-carbon innovation, including hydropower, is a complex process, which
includes research, development, demonstration and deployment. It is not only a technological process, but also
depends on the existence of appropriate incentives for ﬁrms and other organizations to engage in technology deve-
lopment for the creation of markets for technologies, and it requires skilled labour (Ockwell and Mallett, 2013;
Saviotti, 2005). Poor countries, such as Cambodia, are notoriously weak in developing indigenous innovation in
the large-scale energy sector. This puts them at a strategic disadvantage, as energy innovation is important for
ensuring energy security and reducing energy poverty as well as for developing a sustainable, climate-friendly
energy sector that minimizes external dependence. Brewer (2007) therefore refers to the need for a facilitation of
innovation and diffusion through international technology transfer – North–South, South–North and South–South
– under the ‘technology transfer paradigm’.
The IPCC’s Special Report on Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer deﬁnes ‘technology
transfer’ as a ‘broad set of processes covering the ﬂows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and
adapting to climate change […] The broad and inclusive term ’transfer’ encompasses diffusion of technologies
and technology cooperation across and within countries. It comprises the process of learning to understand, utilise
and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions and integrate it with
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indigenous technologies’ (Hedger McKenzie et al., 2000, 1.4). This deﬁnition thus includes both technology trans-
fer and technology cooperation. The understanding of technology transfer and cooperation has broadened in recent
years, moving away from pure ‘hardware thinking’ and the classical North–South model to embed four distinct ﬂows
of know-how, information, experience and equipment: (1) from North to South (such as from the EU to China
and India), usually through foreign direct investment (FDI) and/or overseas development assistance (ODA), joint
ventures and licencing, (2) from South to North (such as from China and India to the EU), such as through joint
ventures and other forms of technology cooperation, (3) from South to South (such as from China and India to other
low- and middle-income countries such as Cambodia), often through FDI and/or ODA, and (4) from North to North
(such as from the EU to the US or vice versa), such as through joint ventures and other forms of technology
cooperation.
Three ﬂows can be distinguished within the process of technology transfer and technology cooperation: (1)
capital goods and equipment, (2) skills and know-how for operation and maintenance and (3) knowledge and exper-
tise for innovation (Ockwell et al., 2007, 2010; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012, 2013). Technology transfer and technol-
ogy cooperation can be between ﬁrms, hence horizontal, and/or include advances in technology development,
hence vertical, e.g. from R&D to commercialization. The nature of technology transfer is in reality diverse and
could mean short- or long-term transfer, transfers within a larger corporation, joint venture or the selling of the
technology. It can span between formal agreements and more informal means such as personnel movement, net-
works and publications (Ockwell and Mallett, 2013). Going beyond traditional technology transfer, which often
focusses on FDI or ODA, involves broader international technology cooperation, which refers to a wide range of co-
operative approaches between ﬁrms and/or countries, including joint ventures, licencing agreements, mergers and
acquisitions.
South–South technology transfer and technology cooperation is a rather new, as yet under-researched phenomenon.
Most of the literature on technology transfer is limited to North–South technology transfer from richer, developed
countries to poorer, developing countries. The rise of China (and other emerging economies) as a new political, eco-
nomic and technological power however challenges the pre-conceptions about technology transfer and shifts the fo-
cus towards South–South technology transfer and cooperation.
These technology transfer theories will be analysed from a sustainable development perspective. ’Sustainable de-
velopment is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential
needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the
state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs’ (WCED,
1987, p. 43). The environmental, social and economic perspectives of sustainable development will be discussed as
well as political and technological considerations with regard to the Kamchay Dam’s technology transfer deal be-
tween China and Cambodia.
Methodology
To discuss the role of South–South technology transfer of low-carbon energy innovation, and its opportunities and
barriers, we selected the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia, Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has the highest number of
Chinese-funded and Chinese-built overseas dams, and the Kamchay Dam is the ﬁrst large dam in Cambodia.
The case study approach is based on the work of Yin (2009).
The paper builds on 24 semi-structured in-depth interviews with local communities directly affected by the dam
through changes to livelihoods, 10 focus group discussions with the same affected communities, 19 interviews with
institutional actors from the national and local governments and NGOs in Cambodia and 18 interviews with
Chinese actors such as dam-builder Sinohydro, regulators and ﬁnanciers. This makes a total of 61 interviews and
10 focus group discussions that we draw on for this paper. See Table 1 for details.
The interviews and focus group discussions aimed to assess the implications of the dam from social, environ-
mental, economic, political and technological perspectives. Local communities were asked about the impacts of
the dam on their lives and livelihoods as well as on the local environment. Cambodian and Chinese authorities were
asked about the implications of the dam, particularly taking into account the technological, economic and political
impacts as well as addressing legislative and contractual issues related to the technology transfer deal. Major issues
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such as type of contract, legislative requirements for dam construction, including EIAs, and issues around the trans-
fer of technology, expertise and knowledge were discussed.
We also used quantitative secondary data from International Rivers’ extensive database, which includes compre-
hensive up-to-date data about each of China’s hydropower projects worldwide and its technology (e.g. contractor, de-
veloper, ﬁnancier, type of hydropower project, costs, size, location, environmental and social implications). We also
compiled secondary data to assess the environmental impacts of dams by examining the EIA report of the dam and
relevant national legislation. We further analysed dam project documentation and ﬁrm strategies, including
Sinohydro’s environmental and social guidelines.
We coded and analysed the interview and focus group consultation data using the NVivo 10 software and narra-
tive analysis, which allows us to compare several interviews to be able to draw parallels from similar ﬁndings and
ﬂag up any differences (Yin, 2009). More speciﬁcally, all 61 interviews were coded according to themes and sub-
themes. The broad themes were divided into social, environmental, economic, political and technological
perspectives. Under each of these broad themes we coded very speciﬁc sub-themes that were based on the ﬁeldwork
information (e.g. EIA procedures, cost of dam, local employment etc.). Each response of the interviewees was coded
in this way and relevant sentences were grouped in the coded sub-themes. This resulted in 3661 coded references
within the 61 interviews, thus enabling us to see a pattern and understand the most important issues of this
ﬁeldwork. While we could include many quotes from the ﬁeldwork in this paper, we decided to summarize the
key ﬁndings due to the low word limit.
Findings
The Kamchay Dam
The Kamchay Dam has a generating capacity of nearly 200 MW. The dam cost an estimated US$280 million
and is ﬁnanced by China Exim Bank as part of a US$600 million aid package to Cambodia. The dam is
based on a concessional loan from Exim Bank that has to be re-paid with 6% interest rates (International
Rivers, 2014). The builders, developers and contractors are Sinohydro. There are a range of reported environ-
mental and social issues related to declines and loss of livelihoods by the local population, dam construction
in a National Park and late EIA approvals (International Rivers, 2014). See Table 2 for the technical details of
the dam.
Sinohydro started building the Kamchay Dam in Kampot Province, Southern Cambodia, in 2006. The dam
started operation in late 2011. The Kamchay Dam is the ﬁrst large hydropower dam in Cambodia and its generating
capacity is much needed in the energy-poor country. The Department of Environment in Kampot province claims
that the dam can supply up to 60% of Cambodia’s energy demand, at least in the wet season. The expected annual
Targets Methods No of interviews Further details
Local communities affected by Kamchay
Dam project (Bat Kbal Damrey, Moat
Peam, Ou Touch, Snam Prampir, Tvi
Khan Cheung)
focus groups 10 focus group discussions
(5–10 people each; about 75
people in total)
50% women; 50% men
Affected individuals from local
communities
semi-structured 24
Institutional actors semi-structured
interviews
19 national/local government,
NGOs
Chinese actors semi-structured
interviews
18 Sinohydro, regulators and
ﬁnanciers
Table 1. Interview setup
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output is 498 GW h; however, in the dry season the generating capacity may be as low as 60 MW, which is less than
a third of the nameplate capacity of 200 MW (NGO Forum, 2013).
The dam is located on the Kamchay River in Bokor National Park, which is the habitat of endemic and rare
species. It is reported that the dam and the reservoir have led to the ﬂooding of 2015 ha of protected forest (NGO
Forum, 2013). The overall affected area is 2291 ha, including roads and infrastructure. The next section discusses
the type of technology transfer deal for the Kamchay Dam.
Type of Technology Transfer
There are various forms of technology transfer: technology transfer that is based on FDI and/or ODA, technology
transfer that involves licencing, technology cooperation that involves joint ventures, and more ‘advanced’ technology
cooperation that includes mergers and acquisitions. This indicates the process from rather simple forms of technol-
ogy transfer to more advanced, neo-liberal means of technology cooperation between two countries. The Kamchay
Dam is part of technology transfer arrangements based on FDI and a large aid deal.
There are also different ﬂows of technology transfer and cooperation: (1) capital goods and equipment, (2) skills
and know-how for operation and maintenance and (3) knowledge and expertise for innovation. Table 3 indicates that
in the case of the Kamchay Dam the ﬂow of technology transfer was mainly limited to capital goods and equipment,
while very few skills and know-how for operation and maintenance, and little knowledge and expertise for building
up domestic production or innovation capabilities, were transferred. Interviews with Cambodian and Chinese insti-
tutional stakeholders conﬁrmed that, while about 3000–4000 Cambodian workers helped construct the dam, they
were low-skilled labourers. The skilled work force, such as engineers and technicians, was Chinese. Today, as the
dam is operating, only Chinese workers are employed to manage, operate and maintain the dam (see also Table 2).
In terms of horizontal versus vertical technology transfer and technology cooperation, for the Kamchay Dam the
technology transfer was horizontal only, namely from China’s SOE Sinohydro to the Cambodian government.
Type of dam hydropower plant: rolling compacted concrete gravity dam
Reservoir capacity
(hundred million m3)
0.98
Reservoir surface area (km2) 20
Purpose power generation (electricity)
Generating capacity (MW) 193.2
Height (m) 114
Length (m) 568
Cost (million US$) 311(IR database); 280 (GEO)
Workforce construction (2006–2011): 3000–4000 Cambodian workers (low-skilled labor workers);
1200 Chinese workers
operation and maintenance (2006–2050): 50–60 Chinese workers (mainly engineers
and technicians)
Average annual electricity
generation capacity (GW h)
4.98
Conﬁguration of powerhouses
(the powerhouse includes
turbines, generators and
transformers)
three powerhouses of 180 MW, 10.1 MW and 4 MW
Electricity supply supplies electricity to Kampot, Phnom Penh and Preah Sihanouk Province
Water ﬂow rate through
turbines (m3 s1)
163.5
Turbines three turbines of capacity of 60 (MW); model,
Francis HL-LJ-240; hydraulic head (m), 122
Table 2. Technical details of the Kamchay Dam. Data from Sinohydro (2014), GEO (2014) and International Rivers (2014)
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Interesting, however, is that this is a case of ‘delayed’ technology transfer, where the ownership of the dam will only
be transferred 44 years after the construction started, namely in 2050. Vertical technology transfer, involving ad-
vances in technology development for Cambodian actors, has not happened in this case.
At the Recipient End of Technology Transfer
Our ﬁeldwork in the Kamchay Dam example revealed that, while hardware has been successfully transferred from
China to Cambodia, there is very limited absorptive capability to be able to operate and manage the dam by
Cambodians and there is very limited production and innovative capability to move from technology transfer to in-
digenous innovation. Bell (1990) divides the technology transfer process into three elements: suppliers, ﬂows and
importers. Bell suggests that ﬂows of capital equipment, and the skills and knowledge for operation, contribute to
production capacity. Flows of knowledge for generating and managing technical change – also called ’know-why’
(Ockwell and Mallett, 2013) – contribute to the accumulation of innovation capabilities. Neither has happened in
the case of the Kamchay Dam, as the dam is built, repaired, operated and managed by Sinohydro, without passing
on the skills and knowledge for operation to Cambodian individuals, ﬁrms or authorities. At the same time there is
no build-up of innovation capabilities at this stage, as long-term training of locals is missing from the technology
transfer arrangement. See Table 4 for details. In addition to the limited build-up of local technical and innovative
capacity, the Cambodian recipient also has limited capacity to deal with the environmental and social impacts of
the dam, as Sinohydro remains the main powerful, albeit laggard, actor in this regard.
The next section discusses the wider implications of the Kamchay Dam technology transfer deal.
Wider Implications of the Kamchay Dam Technology Transfer
Urban et al. (2013) suggest that the wider implications of technology transfer for dam-building and more generally
the social and environmental sustainability of Chinese overseas dams depend on three factors: (1) the type of con-
tract issued between the dam-builder and the host country, (2) the role Chinese dam-builders play and (3) the na-
tional and local legislative setting of the host country.
Technology suppliers – China Technology transfer Technology importers – Cambodia
Sinohydro’s engineering, managerial
and other technological capabilities –
made available to Cambodia for the
Kamchay Dam construction and
operation for 44 years
• capital goods, engineering services,
managerial services, product design
(hardware): transferred to Cambodia
creation of new production capability
and accumulation of innovation
capability: very limited in Cambodia
• skills and knowledge for operation and
maintenance (know-how): limited transfer
to Cambodia
• knowledge, expertise and experience
for generating and managing technical
change (know-why): limited transfer to
Cambodia
Table 4. Process of technology transfer for Kamchay Dam, based on the work of Bell (1990) and Ockwell and Mallett (2013)
Capital goods and
equipment
Skills and know-how for operation
and maintenance
Knowledge and expertise for innovation
Yes, transferred from
China to Cambodia.
Limited; dam operated and maintained
by Chinese Sinohydro for 44 years with
Chinese engineers at the site. Some
Cambodians were trained.
Limited; some training, but overall limited
build-up of indigenous knowledge and
expertise for large dam innovation.
Table 3. Flow of technology transfer, based on the work of Ockwell and Mallett (2013)
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First, the Kamchay Dam is based on a build–operate–transfer (BOT) contract, which in this speciﬁc case means that
the dam was built by Sinohydro from 2006 onwards, then operated and managed for 44 years by Sinohydro, before the
ownership is transferred to the Cambodian government in 2050. This ismuch longer than the standard BOT time length
of 20–30 years. This is in contrast to engineering procurement and construction (EPC) contracts, which are turnkey con-
tracts, meaning that the dam-builder hands over the dam for operation immediately once construction is completed.
BOT contracts generally place the dam-builder in a much more powerful position than EPC contracts and often
tend to be used in poorer countries where the skills, knowledge and expertise on how to operate and manage a dam
are low and where external expertise is needed for innovation and technological development.
Second, dam-builders who are also developers usually have a stronger inﬂuence on the type of technology transfer
agreement as well as planning, siting, impact assessment and how to deal with environmental and social impacts.
Third, the type of technology transfer as well as the sustainability of the dam-building can be greatly inﬂuenced
by the national and local setting of the host country, particularly with regard to the availability and enforcement of
health, safety, environmental and social regulations and legislation (see also Hensengerth, 2013). In addition, the
degree of local expertise and knowledge determines the type of technology transfer. For example, a country that
has higher local expertise and knowledge in the dam industry, such as Malaysia, is more likely to have more ad-
vanced forms of technology transfer such as joint ventures and involving EPC contracts, while a country with very
little local expertise and knowledge in the dam industry, such as Cambodia, depends on FDI, foreign aid and BOT
contracts.
For Cambodia’s Kamchay Dam, all three factors (i.e. BOT type contract; the legislative requirements and their
enforcement being limited, particularly with regard to the EIA; Sinohydro being the developer and the contractor
of the dam) result in a powerful Chinese dam-builder that puts the Cambodian government and the affected people
at the receiving and reactive end of technology transfer. Hence, this is stimulating both a poor enabling environ-
ment for dams in Cambodia and a low capacity to absorb and manage the technology and its impacts.
Table 5 provides an overview of the wider issues related to technology transfer for the Kamchay Dam, including
the three factors of type of contract, role of dam-builder and local legislative setting.
To expand on the EIA issue mentioned earlier, by Cambodian law, development projects such as dams are re-
quired to have an EIA in place and approved before the construction process begins. Cambodian law also prescribes
that the EIA process should be transparent, the decision-making should be accountable and a wide consultation pro-
cess should involve affected local communities and civil society organizations (Middleton, 2008; NGO Forum,
2013). However, at the Kamchay Dam the EIA process started late and the EIA approval was in fact granted seven
months after the inauguration of the dam (International Rivers, 2013; NGO Forum, 2013). According to the inter-
view with Conservation International based in Cambodia, the content of the EIA is of poor quality, as for example
it does not assess the impacts of the dam on species and habitats but only lists what species occur in the national
park. It is also being reported that so far any mitigation measures included in the Environmental Management Plan
(MEP) have not been implemented (NGO Forum, 2013). According to an interview with the Department of Environ-
ment at the provincial level in Kampot, Sinohydro has set aside a so-far untouched budget of US$5 million for
implementing mitigating measures, which cannot be accessed by Cambodian government authorities. This is
due to uncertainties about the state procedure to use the funds and unclear responsibilities for environmental mit-
igation between Sinohydro and the local government, as well as lack of local expertise on environmental manage-
ment and impact mitigation.
The consultation processes before the dam construction was patchy and ad hoc with little local participation, as
our interviews with institutional actors, such as International Rivers, international experts from universities and the
National Disaster Management Committee in Cambodia ﬁnd and other reports conﬁrm (International Rivers, 2013).
Many villagers were not invited to consultation processes and became only aware of the dam once construction
started. The local villagers have complained against Sinohydro in various forms (petitions, mass demonstrations,
ﬁling individual complaints), for example due to the closure of the bamboo forest area. Nevertheless, they had to
follow a strict hierarchy, addressing ﬁrst the village chief, then the commune authority, then the district authority,
then the provincial authority, and from there on the complaints are said to be taken to the appropriate ministries in
Phnom Penh (mainly MIME) or the provincial governor, who then establishes communication with Sinohydro. This
is despite Sinohydro’s ofﬁces being based at the dam site, in very close proximity to the affected villages. The ﬂawed
EIA and consultation process limits best practice for sustainable development.
240 F. Urban et al.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Sust. Dev. 23, 232–244 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/sd
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper aimed to discuss the opportunities, barriers and implications of the technology transfer deal between
China and Cambodia for the Kamchay Hydropower Dam and to elaborate what this means for sustainable
development.
Technologically, Chinese dam-builders are at the cutting-edge of dam-building, constructing the largest and most
complex dams on Earth. Chinese actors are also the leaders in the ﬁeld of South–South low-carbon energy technol-
ogy transfer, most notably in the hydropower sector (International Rivers, 2014). From the outset they offer rare
opportunities for enabling sustainable development, economic growth and modernity to low-income countries that
are affected by energy poverty.
However, there are a set of barriers: low-income countries such as Cambodia have very little capacity to absorb
these technologies and to manage and operate them, let alone to become innovators in hydropower dams them-
selves. In relation to the Kamchay Dam, Cambodia’s ﬁrst large hydropower dam, the paper ﬁnds that, while hard-
ware has successfully been transferred, the skills, knowledge, expertise and experience of how to operate, manage
and build dams rest almost entirely with the Chinese dam-builders, most importantly with Sinohydro. The implica-
tions are that the engineering, human, managerial, organizational and ﬁnancial resources are lacking in Cambodia
to run the dam and to be able to build dams themselves without foreign help.
This ﬁnding is reiterated by other studies. Im (2010) conﬁrms that ’In Cambodia hydropower development de-
pends almost entirely on technical and ﬁnancial assistance from outside dominated by Chinese ﬁrms. The country
Type of contract BOT, transfer to the Cambodian government after 44 years
Financial arrangement Bundled aid and investment as dam is part of US$600 million aid and investment package.
Financier China Exim Bank.
Dam-builder Sinohydro; also developer and contractor.
Governance of dam No dedicated authority in charge of dam. Split responsibilities between Sinohydro and various
ministries, most importantly the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) and the Ministry
of Environment (MoE). Hierarchical and partly non-transparent communication and decision-
making process between these organizations.
Impact on livelihoods Negative impacts on livelihoods as about 22 000 people are directly affected by the dam. Those
affected the hardest are poor bamboo collectors who cannot enter their original bamboo area due
to the dam construction and fruit sellers who are vulnerable due to a sharp decline in tourism
following the dam-building. A lack of alternatives and the absence of any assets have driven local
villagers to borrowing money from micro-credit institutions and considering becoming migrant
workers in Phnom Penh and Thailand. Many villagers still do not have access to electricity.
Resettlements No resettlement, although 10 families live under power lines and will have to be resettled in the
future.
Compensation Yes, no complaints, but no standardized or formalized process.
Location of dam In Bokor National Park.
Impact on environment Loss of forest and bamboo habitats, threats to a wide range of species, including 10 endangered
species such as the Asian elephant, the sun bear, the leopard cat and the tiger.
Responsible government
authorities
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), Ministry of Water Resources and
Meteorology (MOWRAM), Ministry of Environment (MoE).
Legislation BOT projects have to be approved by the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC). Law on
Water Resource Management; all hydropower projects require a water use license from
MOWRAM. Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management, Forestry Law
and a complex and as yet underdeveloped Land Law that has to be complied with.
EIA process Major ﬂaws, EIA process violated Cambodian law, EIA approval received 7 months after the dam
was in operation.
Consultation process Patchy consultation process, many locals were not invited and only knew of dam plans
once construction had begun.
Table 5. Wider implications of technology transfer for Kamchay Dam
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is facing severe lack of local capacity in identifying needs, project planning and operation, not only in hydropower
but also in other related ﬁelds such as ﬁshery biodiversity, which is expected to be largely affected by hydropower
development’ (Im, 2010, p. 2).
This situation is understandable, as Cambodia is a low-income country. Attracting investments by Chinese dam-
builders has been an effective tool to help overcome energy poverty, power economic growth and strive for sustain-
able development. However, in the long run the ﬂow of technology transfer needs to move beyond a technical ﬁx on
hardware and include the transfer of ‘software’ such as skills and know-how for operation and maintenance as well
as the transfer of knowledge and expertise for innovation. South–South technology transfer arrangements in dam-
building should therefore include training options and create opportunities for building up domestic production
and innovation capabilities such as promoted by staff exchanges, training, joint R&D, joint ventures etc.
We conclude that, while South–South technology transfer of low-carbon energy innovation can offer opportuni-
ties for sustainable development, it can only be fully successful when host governments have the capacity to absorb
new technologies. This means that the transfer of technologies needs to go hand in hand with the development of
adequate management frameworks, comprehensive social and environmental policies and guidelines, and an inclu-
sive public consultation process. In addition, the long-term sustainability of the practices of the technology-
transferring country and ﬁrms needs to be improved to ameliorate the capacities for low-carbon technology transfer
on both the recipient and the technology-transferring side. This could include training more technicians and engi-
neers from low-income countries in China to help build up the indigenous hydropower capacity in low-income
countries, ﬁrst in terms of productive capabilities, later in the form of innovative capabilities. This requires moving
towards more advanced forms of technology cooperation. Byrne et al. (2011, 2012) and Ockwell and Mallett (2012)
even suggest going one step further by fostering not only technology transfer, but also wide-ranging socio-technical
transformations. In the future different forms of technology cooperation may be more conducive for promoting sus-
tainable development for Cambodia. This could include licencing hydropower technology for reverse engineering,
joint R&D, joint ventures and acquisitions of parts of small Chinese hydro ﬁrms (e.g. R&D bureaus) by Cambodian
ﬁrms. This is however made more difﬁcult by the scale of large dams. In general, small hydropower might be more
suitable for building up absorptive, production and innovative capabilities than large dams for countries with little
hydropower experience and limited capacity. This revised approach to South–South technology transfer and cooper-
ation may offer new opportunities for sustainable development for low-income countries.
Further empirical research needs to be conducted on South–South technology transfer and its implications, be-
yond Cambodia, China and the dam debate. Further research needs to analyse particularly how skills and knowledge
for operation and maintenance (know-how) and knowledge, expertise and experience for generating and managing
technical change (know-why) for low-carbon energy technology can best be transferred from emerging economies to
low-income countries in the long term and how positive impacts can be maximized and negative impacts mini-
mized, particularly in relation to people’s lives and livelihoods.
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